Ilham Aliyev Factor: How Baku brought together interests of global powers from the Atlantic to the Pacific

BAKU, Azerbaijan, November 20. Over more than two decades, Ilham Aliyev has turned Azerbaijan into a country where the routes and interests of Russia, China, the European Union, the United States and Central Asia converge. The latest confirmation came at the APEC summit in Shenzhen. When Russian President Vladimir Putin invited Asian countries to use the North-South Corridor, he was effectively offering them infrastructure built by Baku, even without explicitly acknowledging it.

At the plenary session of the 33rd APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting on November 18-19, the Russian president outlined Moscow's priorities in the region: digital solutions, energy and food security, and a 60-percent increase in trade with ASEAN. He also invited partners to "actively use the opportunities offered by new transport routes, including the North-South Corridor."

The invitation was aimed at India, the Gulf countries and Southeast Asia. Yet any cargo travelling overland from Mumbai to Moscow along the corridor's western route would necessarily pass through Astara, Baku and Yalama. This is not simply a matter of geography, but the result of Aliyev's policy: Azerbaijan built its transport infrastructure ahead of demand, avoided joining any bloc and positioned itself as a country that all sides need.

Russia, Iran and India signed an agreement on the North-South Corridor on September 12, 2000. The idea was straightforward: cut delivery times between India, Russia and Northern Europe from six weeks to three. A quarter of a century later, Azerbaijan is the only country along the corridor's western route to have fully completed its part of the project.

Azerbaijan's railway network has been extended to the Iranian border at Astara, where a terminal has also been built. Iran's Qazvin-Rasht railway line, spanning 175 kilometers, has been operational since March 2019. However, the 162-kilometer Rasht-Astara section, the main missing link in the entire corridor, still exists only on paper.

Russia and Iran signed an agreement to build the section in May 2023, with Moscow pledging a loan of around 1.3 billion euros. Iran transferred the land required for the route to the Russian side only on November 4, 2026, and even then solely for survey work. The commercial contract has yet to be signed. Russian Railways says construction could begin in 2027 and take three years.

Despite this gap, the route through Azerbaijan is already carrying substantial volumes of cargo. Between January and September 2026, 6.87 million tons of freight moved through the country along the North-South Corridor. At the CIS summit in Turkmenbashi on October 9, Ilham Aliyev outlined a medium-term target of increasing freight volumes along both the East-West and North-South corridors to 15 million tons each.

In effect, by inviting Asia to use the North-South Corridor, Putin is directing it to the only fully operational section of the route - Azerbaijan's. The Russian-Iranian section remains a promise.

The paradox is that the same railways and ports Moscow is promoting to Asian partners are also serving projects in which Russia has no involvement. In the first nine months of 2026, 14.74 million tons of cargo passed through Azerbaijan along the East-West Corridor - twice the volume recorded on the North-South route. Transit through the country has nearly doubled over the past five years and is expected to approach 16 million tons by the end of the year.

Each major player has its own interests in Azerbaijan. Russia, Iran and India need access to the ocean and South Asian markets, and they can use the existing western branch of the North-South Corridor through Azerbaijan to Astara. The EU and Germany are seeking new energy sources and routes to Asia that bypass Russia: Azerbaijan's gas supplies, the Middle Corridor and the Port of Baku serve that purpose. China needs an overland route to Europe that does not cross Russian territory, and its route runs through the Caspian ferry network and the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway. Kazakhstan and Central Asian countries gain access to Türkiye and Europe through Azerbaijani terminals, vessels and the cable laid across the Caspian seabed. The United States, meanwhile, is strengthening its position in the South Caucasus through economic engagement, with the TRIPP route to Nakhchivan as one of its key instruments.

Recent developments are particularly telling. On October 15, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan launched the Trans-Caspian fiber-optic cable linking Sumgayit and Aktau. Stretching 380 kilometers along the seabed, it has a capacity of more than 400 Tbit/s. Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev described it as the Middle Corridor "in digital form." On November 6, the United States, Azerbaijan and Armenia established trilateral working groups on transport and electricity under the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP). And on November 17, a day before the APEC summit, German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul visited Baku. During his meeting with Ilham Aliyev, they discussed energy, transport and logistics, and Wadephul described Azerbaijan as a reliable partner for Germany and the EU.

Within a single week, Washington, Berlin and Astana discussed transport corridors in Baku, while Moscow did so in Shenzhen. Few countries the size of Azerbaijan are important to so many competing powers at once.

Geography placed Azerbaijan between Russia, Iran and Türkiye. Yet the same location has become a dead end for some of its neighbors and an asset for Baku. The difference lies in three decisions Ilham Aliyev made long before transport corridors became a major international priority.

The first was to build ahead of demand and finance infrastructure with domestic resources. The Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway, the port at Alat, the railway line to Astara and the terminal on the Iranian side were developed before there was enough cargo to fill them. When traditional routes between Europe and Asia were disrupted in 2022, the market had no time to wait for alternatives to be built. Cargo moved along routes that were already in place. Baku is now applying the same forward-looking approach: the port's capacity is being expanded from 15 million to 25 million tons, while its container-handling capacity is set to increase from 150,000 to 260,000 TEU in the second half of 2027.

The second was to avoid joining any geopolitical camp. Azerbaijan is not a member of NATO, the Collective Security Treaty Organization or the Eurasian Economic Union, yet it has established working relations with all major centers of power. With China, it has a comprehensive strategic partnership dating from April 2025. With Germany, it has a strategic agenda agreed in July 2026. With the United States, it has the Washington agreements of August 2025 and the TRIPP initiative. With Russia, Baku maintains relations on an equal footing and does not sever ties even during periods of acute tension. This is why the same port is important to both Moscow and Brussels: neither side regards it as belonging to the other.

The third was to make sovereignty a condition for transit development. Azerbaijan's victory in 2020 and the restoration of its territorial integrity in 2023 removed a major source of risk that had kept investors away from the region for decades. A road stretching nearly 150 kilometers, from Horadiz through Jabrayil and Zangilan to Agbend, now runs where the frontline once stood. The Zangezur Corridor could add up to 15 million tons in annual freight capacity. Aliyev himself described Zangezur as a future key section of both the Middle Corridor and the North-South route at the 2025 summit in Tianjin.

The conclusion is straightforward: no major regional decision - whether concerning the North-South Corridor, the Middle Corridor or the East-West route - can now be made without taking Azerbaijan's interests into account.

Azerbaijan was not mentioned in Shenzhen, and that is the main signal. Baku has become part of the infrastructure that other countries present to their partners as a given. Moscow is promoting the North-South Corridor to Asia, Europe and China are betting on the Middle Corridor, and Washington is developing TRIPP. All three projects converge on one country.

This does not prevent the major powers from competing with one another. But each of them has to engage with Baku separately and on terms shaped by Azerbaijan's interests. That is the outcome of Ilham Aliyev's policy: Azerbaijan did not choose whose route to become part of. Instead, it has become a point through which all these routes pass.